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STATUTORY COMMENT
Chemical Tests and Implied Consent
Results of chemical tests of blood to determine alcoholic content
have been admissible under limited conditions' in criminal' and civil3
actions in North Carolina for some time without statutory sanction.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has intimated in State v. Wil-
lard' that test results of urine and other body fluids are also ad-
missible in criminal actions. The court has not had occasion to deal
directly with the admissibility of test results of substances other than
blood and urine.
Tests of the breath" and urine6 as well as blood have been
sanctioned by courts in other jurisdictions, and the United States
Supreme Court has upheld the admissibility of blood' test results
to prove intoxication in criminal cases.
Thus, ample authority for the admissibility of chemical test
results has existed for some time without statutory sanction; how-
ever, several problems have been encountered in North Carolina
which have placed serious limitations upon their use. Some prob-
lems encountered are: (1) Results of a test conducted over the ob-
jection of the defendant may be inadmissible; and (2) The courts
' The North Carolina courts have required as a minimum that the tests
be accurate and conducted according to medically approved standards, and
that a medical expert be available to testify in court as to the effect of a
certain blood alcohol level upon the human body. See, e.g., Osborne v. Ice
Co., 249 N.C. 387, 106 S.E.2d 573 (1958)
2 State v. Willard, 241 N.C. 259, 84 S.E.2d 899 (1954).
'Osborne v. Ice Co., 249 N.C. 387, 106 S.E.2d 573 (1958).
'241 N.C. 259, 84 S.E.2d 899 (1954). Although only a blood test was
involved in this case, the court quoted with approval from Annot., 159 A.L.R.
209, 210 (1945), to the effect that test results of "blood, urine, or other body
fluid" are ordinarily admissible as competent and relevant evidence. Id. at
262, 84 S.E.2d at 901. See also State v. Cash, 219 N.C. 818, 15 S.E.2d 277
(1941), where, although it does not affirmatively appear in the opinion, the
appellate records make it clear that the results of the urinalysis ware admitted.
' People v. Conterno, 17 Cal. App. 2d 817, 339 P.2d 968 (App. Dep't
1959), and State v. Berg, 76 Ariz. 96, 259 P.2d 261 (1953), held that the
forcible taking of a breath specimen for drunkometer tests did not violate
the self-incrimination privilege.
'E.g., Bovey v. State, 197 Misc. 302, 93 N.Y.S.2d 560 (Ct. Cl. 1949)
(taken while driver was unconscious).
'Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
'Although the question of whether consent is required has not been
squarely before the court, it appears the defendent has consented to the test
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of this state generally have required expert testimony to explain (a)
the effect of certain blood-alcohol level on an individual; (b) that
the test was performed according to accepted scientific methods; and
(c) that the test used was an accurate means of measuring the
alcohol content of the blood.'
In an effort to simplify the use of chemical test results as evidence
in certain criminal proceedings, the 1963 General Assembly enacted
legislation which significantly affects this area.10 This comment will
be concerned primarily with that portion of the legislation known as
the "Implied Consent" law."
I. HISTORY
The early chemical test statutes in the United States provided for
admission of chemical test results into evidence to prove intoxication
only if the defendant consented to the test. 2 If the defendant re-
fused, the test could not be given and there was no penalty for
refusal.'" To strengthen its chemical test laws, New York, in 1953,
became the first state to enact what is now known as an implied
consent statute.'4 This statute was based upon the theory that a
license to drive is a privilege rather than a right,' 5 and as such was
subject to be granted or withheld by the state. It provided that in
return for the driving privilege, anyone, whether licensed or not,
who drove in the state was deemed to have given consent to submit
to a chemical test if tendered by a police officer with reasonable
grounds to believe that the person offered the test had been driving
while intoxicated. If the person refused, no test was given, but his
driving privilege was suspended for six months.'"
When such a suspension was effected, it was separate and apart
-in each case. In State v. Cash, 219 N.C. 818, 15 S.E.2d 277 (1941), the
court noted that there was no compulsion on the part of the officers in ob-
taining the blood and urine samples. It may be argued that consent is not
necessary; but if there is no consent, due process may be violated if the
accused resists and force is used. See notes 72 & 73 infra and accompanying
text. See also SMITH, THE LAW OF CONFESSIONS AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
138 (1963).
'State v. Willard, 241 N.C. 259, 84 S.E.2d 899 (1954).
o N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-16.2, -139.1 (Supp. 1963).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.2 (Supp. 1963):
" E.g., Ill. Laws 1957, p. 2262, § 1.
"E.g., Ga. Acts 1953, Nov. Sess. pp. 556, 575.
14 See N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAWS § 1194 (1960).
15 See notes 25 & 26 infra and accompanying text.
N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAWS §§ 510, 1104 (1960).
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from the charge of driving while under the influence.17 It was the
penalty imposed upon the driver for breaching his contract with the
state and continued regardless of the conviction or acquittal on the
drunk driving charge.' Consequently, implied consent may be com-
pared to a simple unilateral contract. The state offers the driving
privilege in return for the driver's agreement to take the chemical
test if requested to do so by a police officer; the driver accepts the
offer when he operates a motor vehicle within the state. Per-
formance on the part of the state is allowing him the driving privi-
lege; performance on the part of the driver is submitting to a test
under the conditions outlined in the pertinent statute. If the driver
subsequently and contrary to the statute refuses to submit to the test,
he has breached his contract, i.e., he has refused to perform.
There has been some confusion resulting from a belief that under
the implied consent law the consent was dependent upon the procure-
ment of a driver's license.' 9 A moment's reflection upon such a
hypothesis reveals that in the case of a person who had no license-
who had never been licensed, whose license was suspended, or who
was a non-resident and licensed in his home state-the consent would
not be implied. To make the law apply equally to all drivers, it must
be contingent upon something other than issuance of a driver's
license; therefore, it has been made dependent upon driving within
the state, or within certain areas of the state.'
II. TE NORTH CAROLINA STATUTE
The 1963 General Assembly enacted the following implied con-
sent law which became effective January 1, 1964:21
"¢Anderson v. MacDuff, 208 Misc. 271, 143 N.Y.S.2d 257 (Sup. Ct.
1955).8 Combes v. Kelly, 2 Misc. 2d 491, 152 N.Y.S.2d 934 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
"9 See Johnson, Blood Test Results-Their Admissibility to Show a
Decedett's Intoxication, 38 IND. L.J. 603, 621 (1963).2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.2(a) (Supp. 1963). In North Carolina such
areas include the public highways, as well as the streets, driveways, and roads
of municipalities, hospitals, schools, universities, churches, state maintained
institutions and premises of commercial establishments. N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 20-139 (Supp. 1963).
" Although some may contend that this is not an "implied consent" law,
the author is of the opinion that it is such because it expressly says that
any person who operates a motor vehicle upon the highways or within certain
other areas of the state shall be deemed to have given consent. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 20-16.2 (Supp. 1963). The statute does not require him to give
express consent as a condition precedent to being subjected to the test. The
argument that it is not an "implied consent" law is based upon the absence of
a provision such as that contained in section 6-205.1 of the Uniform Vehicle
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Any person who operates a motor vehicle upon the public
highways of this State or any area enumerated in G.S. 20-139
shall be deemed to have given consent, subject to the provisions
of G.S. 20-139.1,22 to a chemical test of his breath for the purpose
of determining the alcoholic content of his blood for any offense
arising out of acts alleged to have been committed while the person
was driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxi-
cating liquor. The test or tests shall be administered upon request
of a law enforcement officer having reasonable grounds to believe
the person to have been driving a motor vehicle upon the public
highways of this State or any area enumerated in G.S. 20-139
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test
under the provisions of G.S. 20-16.2, evidence of refusal shall be
admissible in any criminal action growing out of an alleged viola-
tion of driving a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this
State or any area enumerated in G.S. 20-139 while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor.P
While this law neither requires nor authorizes suspension of a
driver's license for refusal to take the test, it does furnish some
inducement to the driver to submit to a breath test if requested to do
so by the arresting officer. It subjects him to something of a
"squeeze play" by specifying that evidence of refusal shall be admis-
sible in any criminal action growing out of the alleged violation of
driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants.24
Code, suspending fhe driver's license for refusal to take the test. See 1963
National Safety Council Committee on Alcohol & Drugs, Annual Report of
Subcommittee on Legal Matters.
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-139.1 provides that evidence of blood-alcohol
content as shown by chemical analysis of the person's breath, shall be ad-
missible in criminal proceedings growing out of the alleged operation of a
motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. To be con-
sidered valid for purposes of this section, tests must be conducted according
to methods approved by the State Board of Health and by a person holding
a valid permit from the State Board of Health for that purpose. Pursuant to
this, the State Board of Health has adopted regulations governing standards
required for certification of persons to conduct the analyses. See Rules
and Regulations, N.C. State Board of Health, Jan. 9, 1964.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.2 (Supp. 1963).
As to the admissibility of evidence of refusal in situations that do not
come within the statute, the prior state of the law in North Carolina as
expressed in State v. Paschal, 253 N.C. 795, 117 S.E.2d 749 (1960), is
pertinent. There evidence of the defendant's refusal to take a blood test
was admitted over the defendant's objection in the trial court. In reviewing
his conviction of driving while under the influence, the North Carolina
Supreme Court held that it was error to have admitted such evidence because
it had no probative value. The court's reasoning was that it had not been
made clear to the defendant whether or not he would have to pay for the
administration of the blood test and that under those circumstances his
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However, admission of evidence of refusal under the authority of
this statute is limited to criminal actions,2 5 and the accused must be
under arrest at the time of refusal .
2
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF IMPLIED CONSENT
Two views have been advanced to support the constitutional
validity of these statutes. The first view is based upon the right-
privilege theory. Basically this theory is that driving a vehicle upon
the highways is a privilege which may be granted or withheld by the
state ;IT since it may be withheld altogether, it also may be granted
upon a condition.' In this case, the condition is that the person
submit to a chemical test to determine the alcoholic content of his
blood if arrested for driving while under the influence. However,
this theory has been somewhat weakened by a tendency of the courts
of this and other states toward holding that driving is more than a
privilege.
29
refusal may have been nothing more than an expression of unwillingness to
pay for the test. In the course of its opinion the court noted the split on
this question in other jurisdictions, id. at 797, 117 S.E.2d at 750-51, and said
that North Carolina is in accord with the view that admission of such
evidence would not violate the privilege against self-incrimination. Ibid.
In doing so the court intimates that such evidence would be admissible in
North Carolina because in those states where the same rule concerning self:
incrimination applies such evidence is admissible, whereas the court itself
notes that in the cases which held such evidence inadmissible the defendant
had an absolute right to refuse to take the test. Id. at 798, 117 S.E.2d at 751.
It is also interesting to note the court's holding because it also intimates
that such evidence would be admissible. If such evidence would in all
events be inadmissible, it is strange that the court would base its decision on
the following language: "Presumably, such blood test, if requested by de-
fendant, would have been made at his expense." Ibid. However, this same
language indicates that the court is instinctively suspicious of attempts to
admit such evidence and that it will sometimes resort to extreme lengths to
exclude it. This is so because the defendant had been asked "if he would like
to take a blood test," which is not the same thing as requesting a blood test.
Id. at 795, 117 S.E.2d at 749.
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-139.1 (Supp. 1963).
" Ibid. This should be a sufficient safeguard against the problem en-
countered under the New York law in Schutt v. MacDuff, 205 Misc. 43, 127
N.Y.S.2d 116 (1954) (statute not limited to case where there was lawful
arrest).
"' Sigler, Virginia's Implied Consent Statute: A Survey and Appraisal,
49 VA. L. Rav. 386 (1963).
" The rationale behind this approach is analogous to that employed to
sustain statutes similar to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-105 (1929), which provides
for service of process upon non-residents by service upon the Commissioner
of Motor Vehicles. The North Carolina statute has not been reviewed by
the United States Supreme Court, but similar statutes have been upheld.
See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
2 See Gibson v. Scheidt, 259 N.C. 339, 344, 130 S.E.2d 679, 683 (1963),
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The second theory is that it does not really matter whether such
a statute is labelled as an implied consent statute or not so long as it
does not violate the due process of law requirement and it is a
reasonable exercise of the police power. As expressed by the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in the case of
Wall v. King,3 0 the use of a motor vehicle "is a liberty which under
the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be denied or curtailed by the
state without due process of law.""1 Those who take this position
base their rationale upon the social and economic importance of the
automobile to the individual in modern society.3 2 To satisfy this
due process of law requirement, the statute must be aimed at a
legitimate end and reasonably suited to accomplish that end, and the
danger it seeks to protect against must be of such a nature that it
warrants a slight infringement upon the liberty93 of all drivers to
require them to submit to a chemical test.
Implied consent statutes have traditionally been subjected to con-
stitutional attack on grounds that such statutes violate the privilege
against self-incrimination, that administering the tests constitutes a
violation of the protection against unreasonable search and seizure,
and that such statutes offend the due process of law provision of the
fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution. Several state
supreme courts have construed and upheld implied consent statutes
against attacks on constitutional grounds, 4 but the United States
Supreme Court has never decided the constitutionality of such
statutes.35
where it was held to be "a privilege in the nature of a right"; and Honeycutt
v. Scheidt, 254 N.C. 607, 609, 119 S.E.2d 777, 780 (1961), where it was held
to be "a right, nof a natural right, but a conditional privilege which may be
suspended or revoked under the police power." See also State v. Moseng, 254
Minn. 263, 95 N.W.2d 6 (1959).80 206 F.2d 878 (1st Cir. 1953).
81206 F.2d at 882.
82 See Sigler, Virginids Implied Consent Statute: A Survey and Ap-
praisal, 49 VA. L. REv. 386 (1963).
" Under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.2 (Supp. 1963), the driver is deemed to
have consented if requested to do so by a law enforcement officer having
reasonable grounds to believe the driver has operated a vehicle while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor.
, Most attacks in state courts have been based on the assertion that it
violated the privilege against self-incrimination. See State v. Durrant, 188
A.2d 526 (Del. 1963); Prucha v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 172 Neb.
415, 110 N.W.2d 75 (1961); Finocchairo v. Kelly, 11 N.Y.2d 58, 181 N.E.2d
427 (1962).
8 In Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 435 n.2 (1957), Mr. justice
Clark did refer to the Kansas statute with apparent approval.
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A. Does the Statute Violate the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination?
The privilege against self-incrimination existed at common law
and has been preserved by the fifth amendment to the Constitution
of the United States.36 At common law this privilege was limited
to the process of disclosure by utterance either written or oral, and
a majority of the courts in this country have adhered to that posi-
tion. 37 As the privilege developed it was limited to court proceedings
and was aimed at preventing the courts from using the contempt
power to compel an accused to testify against himself.38 The North
Carolina Supreme Court has said that the privilege against self-
incrimination "includes only the process of testifying by word of
mouth or in writing, i.e., the process of disclosure by utterance.
'3 9
The majority view in this country is that the privilege does not ex-
tend to physical evidence, including items in the possession of the
accused or distinguishing or identifying features upon the person of
the accused.4" Since a breath, blood, or urine sample, as well as
any other matter which may be used in performing a blood-alcohol
analysis, is not an utterance but falls into the category of physical
evidence, it follows that such evidence does not come within the
privilege against self-incrimination under the majority view.4 1
Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that North Carolina has not
decided this question.
Another provision of the implied consent section should be con-
sidered in the light of the privilege against self-incrimination. If a
person under arrest refuses to undergo a chemical breath test when
requested to do so by a law enforcement officer, the statute says
that "evidence of refusal shall be admissible in any criminal action."
Although there are cases from other jurisdictions directly on point,42
" See, e.g., N.C. CONST. Art. 1, § 11. Although the exact language of
the provision differs from state to state, all states have a privilege similar to
that contained in the fifth amendment.
"'8 WIGM0RE, EVIDENCE § 2250 (McNaughton rev. 1961) [hereinafter
cited as WIGLMORE].
,' Ibid.
'o State v. Paschal, 253 N.C. 795, 797, 117 S.E.2d 749, 751 (1960). See
also State v. Grayson, 239 N.C. 453, 80 S.E.2d 387 (1954) ; State v. Eccles,
205 N.C. 825, 172 S.E. 415 (1934); State v. Garrett, 71 N.C. 85 (1874).
,WIGMOARE § 2265.
41 See text accompanying note 40 supra. Only one case has been found
in which evidence of a chemical test was held to violate the privilege.
Apodaca v. State, 140 Tex. Crim. 593, 146 S.W.2d 381 (1940).
" See, e.g., People v. One 1941 Mercury Sedan, 74 Cal. App. 2d 199, 168
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North Carolina has never decided whether this violates the privilege
against self-incrimination. In State v. Pascha4 3 the question was
raised but not answered, since the court there determined that there
was in fact no refusal. However, the court noted44 that the jurisdic-
tions which limit the privilege against self-incrimination to utterances
generally hold that the admission of evidence of refusal does not
violate the privilege45 and that the jurisdictions which have held
such evidence inadmissible have done so on the grounds that their
implied consent statute gives the accused the absolute right to re-
fuse,46 or that the evidence was of no probative value.
There may be some merit to the argument that the privilege is
violated by admitting evidence of refusal, even in jurisdictions which
testrict the privilege to utterances. The refusal will most often be
in the nature of a verbal utterance, although it is not difficult to
imagine refusals when the accused has not spoken a word. How-
ever, even if the refusal is a verbal utterance, it still should not
come within the rule against self-incrimination because it does not
take place in court.4 8  Furthermore, the states Which have held this
admissible have drawn analogies between this and the admission
of evidence of flight to avoid prosecution, remaining silent when
confronted with an accusation, escape, fabricating or destroying evi-
dence, and concealmeit of identity. One of the earlier cases up-
holding the admissibility of evidence of refusal was State v. Gatton,50
an Ohio case. That court avoided the self-incrimination argument
by saying that "the evidence offered was not required to be given
by the defendant himself, but by the deputy sheriff and the doctor
called by the deputy to make the examination of defendant.151
This result is in accord with the privilege as it was known at
P.2d 443 (Dist. Ct. App. 1946) ; State v. Smith, 230 S.C. 164, 94 S.E.2d 886(1956); Gardner v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 945, 81 S.E.2d 614 (1954).
"253 N.C. 795, 117 S.E.2d 749 (1960).
"253 N.C. at 798, 117 S.E.2d at 751.
"See State v. Durrant, 188 A.2d 526 (Del. 1963) ; State v. Gatton, 60
Ohio App. 192, 20 N.E.2d 265 (1938); State v. Smith, 230 S.C. 164, 94
S.E.2d 886 (1956); Gardner v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 945, 81 S.E.2d
614 (1954).
,6 People v. Stratton, 286 App. Div. 323, 143 N.Y.S.2d 365 (Sup. Ct.
1955); State v. Hedding, 122 Vt. 379, 172 A.2d 599 (1961).
"State v. Munroe, 22 Conn. Supp. 321, 171 A.2d 419 (1961).
"See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
'° See note 38 supra.
"60 Ohio App. 192, 20 N.E.2d 265 (1938).9160 Ohio App. at 193, 20 N.E.2d at 266.
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common law.52 A later case from Virginia said, after discussing
the Ohio case, that "there is no merit in defendant's contention that
the admission of the testimony, was a violation of his constitutional
right against self-incrimination. 53  In a still later case from South
Carolina, it was said that whether evidence of refusal is admissible
"depends upon whether the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination bars admission into evidence, where the accused is
charged with drunken driving, the result of a chemical test to' which
the defendant is subjected while under arrest."54 Then the cofirt
held that the admission of cheinical test results did not violate the
self-incrimination' privilege and accbrdingly held that it Was not
error to admit evidence of refusal.
If it were determined that the privilege applies here, it still may
notbe invoked to exclude the refusal unless there is compihlsion;15
for even though the -accused is faced With the ch6ice of utidergoing
the test and having the results admitted or refusing and having evi-
dence of that refusal admitted in evidence against him, the majority
of the courts hold that this choice, sianding alone, is not sufficient to
constitute compulsion.56
So far the United States Supreme Court has limited the privilege
to utterances 57 although a minority of its members seem to be in
favor of extending it to incriminating evidence taken from the ac-
cused without his consent. In Rochin v. California,58 Mr. Justice
Black59 and Mr. Justice Douglas ° expressed this view in concurring
opinions. In Breithaupt v. Abram,", they were joined by Mr. Chief
Justice Warren in dissenting from the court's decision upholding the
admissibility of blood test results where the blood was withdrawn
from defendant while he was unconscious in a hospital following an
2 WIGM Oa § 2250.
" Gardner v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 945, 952, 81 S.E.2d 614, 618 (1954).
" State v. Smith, 230 S.C. 164, 167, 94 S.E.2d 886, 888 (1956).
q' State v. Sheffield, 251 N.C. 309, 111 S.E.2d 195 (1959) ; State v. Floyd,
246 N.C. 434, 98 S.E.2d 478 (1957).
" State v Durrant, 188 A.2d 526 (Del. 1963) ; Prucha v. Department of
Motor Vehicles, 172 Neb. 415, 110 N.W.2d 75 (1961); Finocchairo v. Kelly,
11 N.Y.2d 58, 181 N.E.2d 427 (1962). See also DONIGAN, CHEMICAL TESTS
AND THE LAW 148 (1957).
"' No case was found where the United States Supreme Court held the
privilege applicable to anything other than verbal utterances.
08342 U.S. 165 (1952).
50 342 U.S. at 174.00 342 U.S. at 177.
61352 U.S. 432 (1957).
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automobile accident.62 The majority dismissed the argument that
the admission of this evidence violated his rights under the fifth
amendment to the United States Constitution on the grounds that
Wolf v. Colorado63 still applied and that the fifth amendment was
not binding upon the states. It should be noted that Mapp v. Ohio,6"
which will be commented upon later, 5 had not been decided at this
time.
B. Does the Statute Violate the Prohibition Against Unreasonable
Searches and Seizures?
Although the question has never been decided by the United
States Supreme Court or by the Supreme Court of North Carolina,
some authorities take the position that the taking of a specimen of
blood, urine, or breath for the purpose of analyzing it for alcohol
content constitutes a search and seizure.6 In Olmstead v. United
States,17 the Supreme Court of the United States held that a wiretap
was not a search; but even if the Court should adhere to that position
today," it still does not follow that the Court would hold the subject
under discussion not to be a search. Here, something physical is
taken from the body; whereas in Olnmstead only a message was
intercepted.
Assuming that requiring submission to a chemical test as con-
templated by the implied consent statute comes within the rule against
unreasonable searches and seizures, the test results still may not be
excluded under this rule6' if the accused consents, if the search was
incidental to a lawful arrest, or possibly if a search warrant existed
for the test. Under the North Carolina law only the first two al-
ternatives are available since the North Carolina statutes do not
02 352 U.S. at 440.
" 338 U.S. 25 (1949). Although in Wolf the fourth amendment was
directly in issue, the Court in Breithaupt used Wolf as authority for rejecting
the self-incrimination argument.
6, 367 U.S. 643 (1960). A Pennsylvania case decided in 1963 takes the
position that Mapp does not alter the result reached in Breithaupt. Common-
wealth v. Tanchyn, 200 Pa. Super. 148, 188 A.2d 824 (1963).
6" See notes 75-77 infra and accompanying text.
" DONIGAN, CHEMICAL TESTS AND THE LAW 94 (1957); SMITH, THn
LAW OF CONFESSIONS AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 136-37 (1963). See also
People v. Duroncelay, 48 Cal. 2d 766, 312 P.2d 690 (1957) ; State v. Kroening,
274 Wis. 266, 79 N.W.2d 810 (1956).67277 U.S. 438 (1928).
68 It is doubtful that Olinstead would be used as a precedent today. See
Kamisar, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Professor's View,
44 MINN. L. REv. 891 (1960).
" Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1960).
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provide for warrants for search of bodily fluids or substances."0
Because of this and because the implied consent statutes have not
been passed upon by the United States Supreme Court or the North
Carolina Supreme Court, it seems that until they are passed upon by
one of these courts, the safest procedure under such a statute is to
justify the test as incidental to a lawful arrest.
The United States Supreme Court has said that a search of the
person, as well as the place of the arrest, without a search warrant
as incidental to a lawful arrest when conducted for the purpose of
discovering fruits or instruments of the crime or a means of escape
is permissible."' Some state courts have also upheld such a search
for evidence of guilt,"2 and to avoid destruction of evidence. 7
A certain blood-alcohol level is an element of the crime of driving
a motor vehicle while under the influence. 4 Is not the alcohol in
the blood an instrumentality by which the crime is committed?
While it is certainly evidence of the crime, it seems that it might
well fall within the category of an instrumentality of the crime also.
A further consideration in this area is whether the taking of a
breath sample at the police station thirty minutes or an hour after
the arrest is sufficiently close in point of time to be incidental to the
arrest. In Ker v. California,5 the United States Supreme Court
upheld the admissibility of evidence seized prior to, but very close
in point of time to, the arrest. The evidence admitted was marijuana
which was seen lying upon a table by the officer. The Court agreed
with the California court that there was no search "since the officer
merely saw what was placed before him in full view."7' The United
States Supreme Court, however, refused to find the search incidental
to a lawful arrest in Stoner v. California,'7 where the search was
made of defendant's hotel room in Pomona, California, while he was
absent, but was arrested two days later in Las Vegas, Nevada, be-
cause the search was completely unrelated to the arrest, both as to
time and as to place. And in Preston v. United States,8 the Court
See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-25, -25.1 (Supp. 1963).7 1Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925). The Court there em-
phasized the requirement that the search be incidental to an arrest.
' Elliott v. State, 173 Tenn. 203, 205, 116 S.W.2d 1009, 1011 (1938).
Reifsnyder v. Lee, 44 Iowa 101 (1876).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-138, -139, -139.1 (Supp. 1963).
' 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
76 374 U.S. at 43.
' 32 U.S.L. WEEK 4227 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1964).7832 U.S.L. WEEK 4258 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1964).
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held that the search of an automobile after its occupants were taken
into custody and after it was towed to a garage for storage was too
remote from the arrest as to time and place. These cases indicate
that the search must be substantially contemporaneous -with the
arrest in order to be justifiable as incidental thereto.
If the search is to be justified as an incident to an arrest, may it
be incidental to arrest for any crime, or must it be limited to an
arrest for driving while under the influence? At least one case
decided by a United States' court'of appeals holds that the search
may be for evidence of a crime other than the one for which the
accused is arrested. In Charles v. United States,7 9 the accused was
arrested upon two warrants charging "threatening and assault and
batiery," and at the time of the arrest he was "frisked" and found
to be unarmed. Shortly thereafter one of the arresting officers told
the accused to empty his pockets; in complying, the accused placed
in the view of the arresting officer a packet of marijuana. The
defendant was then arrested for unlawful possession of narcotics
and the premises were searched. During this' search a second package
of marijuana was discovered in the garage. The court held that the'
second gearch' of the person of the accused which revealed the first
packet of marijuana, as well as the search of the premises in which
the officers uncovered the second packet of the drug, were lawful and
permissible under the fourth amendment to the United States Consti-'
tution and that the evidence was properly received in a prosecution
for unlawful acquisition and importation of marijuana. The court,
recognized that the search was not for evidence of the crime for
which the accused was arrested, but that it was for evidence of a com-
pletely different crime. In holding that this did not affect the ad-
missibility of the evidence, the court said:
It seems to us that a search of the person of the accused, even
for the purpose of uncovering evidence of a crime other than that
which is charged, is generally incident to a valid arrest. Power
over the body of the accused is the essence of his arrest; the two
cannot be separated. To say that the police may curtail the liberty
of the accused but refrain from impinging upon the sanctity of his
pockets except for enumerated reasons is to ignore the custodial
duties which devolve upon arresting authorities. Custody must
of necessity be asserted initially over whatever the arrested party
has in his possession at the time of apprehension. Once the body
of the accused is validly subjected to the physical dominion of the
" 278 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 831 (1960).
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law, inspections of his person, regardless of purpose, cannot be
deemed unlawful unless they violate the dictates of reason either
because of their number or their manner of perpetration. Hence,
we think that the second search of appellant's person was permis-
sible under the Fourth Amendment, and the packet of marijuana
thereby obtained was properly admitted into evidence. Conse-
quently, as previously noted, the search for the second package
was also lawful, and it too was properly seized and correctly
admitted in evidence.8"
It is interesting to note that the court also said that searches
of the person as well as the place where the arrest is made derive
their legality, in absence of a search warrant, from the existence of
a lawful arrest."' The valid arrest to which the search is incidental
saves it from proscription. 2
Two North Carolina cases on this subject deserve comment.
In State v. Fowler83 it was held that where police officers had
reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant had committed a
felony, they were privileged to search his person after he was placed.
under arrest. There was no search or arrest warrant, but he was'
arrested for burglary and his person was searched. The court held
that the items found upon his person were admissible. even though
there was no search warrant since the search was incidental to the
arrest. A more recent case in which the court considered this
subject is State v. Grant,4 in which the defendant was arrested for
assault. As a result of a search of his person, marijuana cigarettes
were found. The court held that the contraband was admissible in
a criminal prosecution for illegal possession of a narcotic drug.
Note that here the North Carolina court upheld a search of the
person without a warrant, as incidental to a lawful arrest, and that
the evidence gained thereby was introduced at the trial for an offense
other than the one for which the accused had been arrested.
Even though there is considerable case law which upholds the
admissibility of evidence seized while the defendant was under arrest
for committing an unrelated crime, the matter is not settledAs5
80 278 F.2d at 388.
81278 F.2d at 389.
82 Harris v. United States; 331 U.S. 145 (1947) ; Agnello v. United States,
269 U.S. 20 (1925).88172 N.C. 905, 90 S.E. 408 (1916).
248 N.C. 341, 103 S.E.2d 339 (1958).85 No case has been found in which the United States Supreme Court has
been faced with this question.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Therefore, if at all possible, the prudent practice would be to justify
a breath test as incident to an arrest for an offense, an element of
which is alcohol in the bloodstream.
C. Does the Statute Deny Due Process?
A further constitutional restriction must be observed in dis-
cussing whether requiring an accused to submit to a chemical test
violates the "due process" clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution." In Breithaupt v. Abram,", the de-
fendant's pick-up truck collided with a passenger car. Three oc-
cupants of the car were killed and defendant Breithaupt was seriously
injured. He was taken to a hospital where, while he was un-
conscious, twenty cubic centimeters of blood were withdrawn by use
of a hypodermic needle at the request of a state patrolman. After
withdrawing the blood, the attending physician delivered it to the
state patrolman, and subsequent laboratory analysis indicated that
the defendant was under the influence.88 This evidence was ad-
mitted over defendant's objection at his subsequent trial for man-
slaughter. Breithaupt was convicted and did not appeal, but later in
post conviction proceedings he attacked the conviction on the grounds
that he had been denied due process of law. The Supreme Court of
the United States rejected the defendant's contentions and upheld his
conviction as at least not violating the rules of fundamental fairness.
In doing so the Court noted that blood tests are routine in our
everyday life 9 and stressed that the blood was withdrawn by a
"skilled teclmician." 90  It concluded that a test so conducted was
not in violation of due process.
In reaching its conclusion the Court used the standards set down
in Rochin v. California.91 There, three deputy sheriffs had illegally
entered defendant's dwelling after receiving information that he
was selling narcotics. The deputies entered through an open outside
door, then forced their way into defendant's bedroom on the second
floor where he was at the time. The deputies saw two capsules lying
" N.C. CoNsT., Art. I, § 17 is the similar provision of the North Carolina
Constitution.
1352 U.S. 432 (1957).
1' 352 U.S. at 433. The blood-alcohol level was 0.17%. Under N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 20-139.1 (Supp. 1963), if there is as much as 0.10% it raises
a presumption that the subject is under the influence.
8' 352 U.S. at 436.
00 352 U.S. at 437.
"342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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on a nightstand beside the bed. When questioned as to what the
capsules were, Rochin put them into his mouth and swallowed them
despite the officers' attempts to retrieve them by force. The officers
then handcuffed him and took him to the hospital where a doctor at
the request of the officers and against the will of the accused forced
an emetic solution through a tube into Rochin's stomach, causing
vomiting. The capsules were retrieved, and it was determined that
they contained morphine. The capsules thus procured were used as
evidence in his subsequent trial for illegal possession of morphine.
In the United States Supreme Court the petitioner contended that
this action by the deputies violated the due process guarantee of the
fourteenth amendment and that evidence as to the capsules should
have been excluded. In reversing the conviction the Court agreed
with the petitioner saying:
We are compelled to conclude that the proceedings by which
this conviction was obtained do more than to offend some fas-
tidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combatting
crime too energetically. This is conduct that shocks the con-
science. Illegally breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, the
struggle to open his mouth and remove what was there, the forcible
extraction of his stomach's contents-this course of proceeding
by agents of government to obtain evidence is bound to offend
even hardened sensibilities. They are methods too close to the
rack and the screw to permit of constitutional differentiation. 92
In reaching a result in Breithaupt different from that in Rochin,
the Court said that the basic distinction was that there is nothing
"offensive" or "brutal" in the taking of a blood sample when ac-
complished "under the protective eye of a physician." 3  Obviously,
two factors which the Court considered very important in the
Breithaupt case were the absence of force and the medical safeguards
used in extracting the blood sample.
Breithaupt's conviction was also attacked in the Supreme Court
on the grounds that the search was unreasonable and that the blood
test results should have been excluded. In refusing to sustain this
02 342 U.S. at 172.
03 352 U.S. at 435. In the Breithaupt case there were two dissenting
opinions. The dissenters were of the opinion "that due process means at least
that law-enforcement officers in their efforts to obtain evidence from persons
suspected of crime must stop short of bruising the body, breaking skin,
puncturing tissue or extracting body fluids whether they contemplate doing
it by force or stealth." 352 U.S. at 440 (1957). Black and Douglas also
thought that the privilege against self-incrimination had been violated.
352 U.S. at 442.
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attack, the Court said that Wolf v. Colorado04 still controlled and
that the exclusionary rule was not binding upon the states. Note,
however, that Mapp v. Ohio9 5 has since overruled Wolf and imposed
the exclusionary rule upon the states. This does not mean that
Breithaupt would be decided differently today, but the same reasoning
would not be available to overcome the search and seizure objection.
In Blackford v. United States,96 the defendant had hidden a con-
tainer of heroin in his rectum. When officers at the customs
station where he attempted to enter the United States from Mexico
noticed needle marks on his arms, he admitted being an addict.
Upon request of the officers he removed his clothes and the officers
detected a greasy substance in the area of the rectal opening. He
then admitted having a container of heroin in his rectum. After
defendant attempted unsuccessfully to remove the container officers
took him to a doctor and had it removed, over the objections of de-
fendant. Since force was used to overcome defendant's objections
here, the argument for exclusion of the evidence was stronger than in
Breithaupt, but the court held that the conduct of the officers was not
sufficient to bring it within the rule announced in Rochin. The court
of appeals also held this to be a reasonable search since it was in-
cidental to a lawful arrest.
Considering these three cases in connection with the North Caro-
lina "Implied Consent" law, it seems that so long as there is no
police abuse, and proper medical safeguards are used, the law will
withstand attacks based upon violation of due process.
IV. CONCLUSION
Due to the great difficulty in determining, without the aid of
chemical tests, whether a person is under the influence, it seems that
the statute is reasonably adapted toward accomplishing the end at
which it is aimed-keeping drinking drivers off the roads. Although
its value as a psychological deterrent to driving while under the in-
fluence will depend somewhat upon a knowledge among the general
public that such a statute exists, it will no doubt result in more con-
victions. Since conviction of driving while under the influence re-
quires the licensee's driver's license to be revoked," it will no doubt
keep some drivers off the road. The final question to be resolved-
"338 U.S. 25 (1949).
"367 U.S. 643 (1960).
"247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-17, -19(f) (Supp. 1963).
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whether the danger sought to be protected against is such that it war-
rants a slight infringement upon the liberty of the individual-is a
more difficult one. It seems that the answer to this question depends
upon whether the right of the many to use the highways without
being endangered by intoxicated drivers outweighs the privilege of
the individual driver to refuse to submit to a chemical test without
fear of those sanctions contemplated by the implied consent statutes. 8
Protection from the dangers posed by drinking drivers to the vast
number of persons using the highways should outweigh the right
of the individual to be protected from a slight encroachment.
Even though North Carolina's statute does not absolutely require
the accused to undergo a chemical test of his breath, it offers some
inducement to do so. Therefore, we must examine it and determine
whether constitutional safeguards are thereby violated. Although
some members of the United States Supreme Court seem to be in
favor of extending the privilege against self-incrimination, it has.
traditionally been limited to utterances, whether written or oral, and
the taking of a breath sample does not fit into this category. Taking
of a breath sample for a chemical test may be characterized as a
search; however, if the search is incidental to a lawful arrest, it is
not unreasonable in the absence of police brutality or some other
indiscriminate action on the part of those conducting the test and
making the arrest. If the evidence is illegally obtained, due either to
lack of consent or because it was not incidental to a lawful arrest, it
will fall within the exclusionary rule and be inadmissible. In de-
termining whether the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment is violated, the rule announced in Rochin v. California99 will be
followed, and unless there is conduct that "shocks the conscience"
or "offends a sense of justice," the due process clause will not be
invoked to exclude the evidence.
ROBERT L. GUNN*
98Most implied consent statutes require suspension or revocation of the
person's driver's license for refusal to submit to such a test. E.g., N.Y.
VEHICLE & TRAFFIc LAWS § 510 (1960). The refusal is admissible in evi-
dence. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.2 (Supp. 1963).
'o 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
* Assistant Director, Institute of Government, University of North Caro-
lina.
STATUTORY COMMENT
Court Reform-Suggested Legislative Action Under the 1962 Con-
stitutional Amendment
The 1962 amendment to the North Carolina Constitution erects
the framework for a new court system, along the general lines of the
system adopted in England almost a hundred years ago.' The funda-
mental characteristic of the new system is that there is to be "one
Court" and only one. This basic principle is designed (a) to elimi-
nate the confusion of courts now existing below the superior court;
(b) to minimize jurisdictional disputes that take up judicial time
without reaching the merits of the case; and (c) to provide for
efficient judicial administration soas to minimize delay and cost in
the trial of suits.
I. ALLOCATION OF "JURISDICTION"
A. Generally
The 1962 amendment provides for a General Court of Justice,
which is to operate as a single or "unified" court for "purposes of
jurisdiction ... and administration."2 The General Court will, how-
ever, work through three distinct "divisions," to be known as the
appellate division (the supreme court), the superior court division,
and the district court division.' The legislature is in effect instructed
to allocate to each division an appropriate case load.4 In traditional
language-no longer appropriate when only one court is involved - -
this means that the legislature must prescribe the "jurisdiction" of
each division. As a practical matter this means that the work of the
district court, which replaces all the present inferior courts, must be
'The judicature Act, 36, 37 Victoria c. 66 (1873). There are a large
number of discussions. See 1 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
638-45 (7th ed. 1956).2 N.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
Ibid.
'N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 10.
' Since there is only one court, if any division of the court has jurisdiction,
then all have jurisdiction. However, case loads must be parceled out for
efficient administration and the legislature may nevertheless make it error
for one division to act in a given case. But if a division acts beyond its
allocation of case load, it is only error and not an excess of jurisdiction.
This is discussed more fully below. See Part II, infra.
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prescribed. Virtually all other trial work will then fall to the
superior courts and their clerks.'
Jurisdiction of inferior courts in this country is typically limited
by a two-fold method. It is first limited by providing that the court
shall hear cases involving a limited amount in controversy. ' It is
then further limited by providing that the court shall hear cases in-
volving only certain subject matter.' These two limitations are often
combined, as with the present justice court in North Carolina, which
may hear cases in tort involving less than fifty dollars, and cases in
contract involving less than two-hundred dollars.'
The difficulty with all jurisdictional limitations is that they are
uncertain. This uncertainty provokes litigation about the limitations
themselves, delaying litigation on the merits, increasing expense, and
using valuable judicial time. The goal in allocating case loads to the
divisions of the General Court, then, is to provide a set of limitations
that are simple and dear.
B. Subject Matter Limitations
One example of a limitation upon subject matter jurisdiction is
the common rule that some inferior courts may not hear disputes
involving title to real property."0 Such a limitation is maladapted
to the unified court system under the new constitution, since it might
require the superior court to hear and determine a case of trifling di-
mensions simply because a feud develops over a small tract of worth-
less land, while cases of real magnitude and urgency await in a
private purgatory at the foot of the docket. More important, per-
haps, is the fact that such a limitation is uncertain and causes litiga-
tion before the merits can be reached. This has been true both in
North Carolina" and elsewhere,12 because title to land may be in-
'The appellate division or supreme court is given traditional appellate
powers, powers to issue any remedial writs to give it supervision and control
over the other divisions, and some limited original jurisdicton. N.C.
CoNsT. art. IV, § 10(1).
"E.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-32 (1958).
'E.g., cases whch arise under federal laws, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1958), or
cases in which opposing parties are citizens of different states, 28 U.S.C.§ 1332 (1958).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7-121 (1953).
"0 Before the 1962 amendment, this rule was constitutional in North
Carolina. N.C. CoNsT. art. IV, § 27 (1868).See cases cited in note 13 infra.12E.g., Wood Garage v. Jasper, 41 N.M. 289, 67 P.2d 1000 (1937), which
was a suit over a bank deposit; one party asserted money derived from oil
1964]
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volved in many cases quite incidentally, as in trespass actions, and it
may be impossible to determine in advance of actual litigation about
it whether the involvment is sufficient to deprive the justice of juris-
diction.'3
Similar difficulties are experienced if jurisdiction turns on
whether the action is one in contract or tort. Suppose, for example,
plaintiff waives the tort and sues in assumpsit. Is the action to be
regarded as one in contract or tort?'4 In this and other situations
it is often impossible to determine the nature of the action.'5 In
nuisance cases in which a governmental agency is involved as defend-
ant, the theory is often that property is "taken."' Is such an action
classified as one in tort for nuisance, or one of "inverse" eminent
domain? And what of a contract in a domestic relations setting-
should it be decided in a court hearing contract actions, or one hear-
ing domestic relations actions?
The long and the short of all this is that such categories as "title
actions," "contract actions," and "tort actions" are too uncertain to
furnish a suitable guide to the jurisdiction of courts. If the new
district courts are limited to relatively small claims, a dollar-amount
limitation would be considerably more certain and much easier to
apply in most cases. No doubt there has been some ground in the
past for limiting the powers of -some inferior court judges, especially
in sensitive areas where abuse of power might cause special harm.
This probably explains the rule against trying title in justice courts.' 7
However, such limitations are, -as indicated, complicating factors
which cause wasteful litigation, and the new system may well place
more confidence in the district judges. Furthermore, if adequate
appeal rights are provided, and jurisdiction limited to a certain dollar
lease on land and claimed title to land, hence, title to money; held, title was
only incidentally involved, justice had jurisdiction.
" Hahn v. Fletcher, 189 N.C. 729, 128 S.E. 326 (1925); Edwards v.
Cowper, 99 N.C. 421, 6 S.E. 792 (1888); Atlantic, T. & O.R.R. v. Johnson,
70 N.C. 509 (1874).
1, Stroud v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 148 N.C. 54, 61 S.E. 626 (1908)
(waiver of tort converts action to one ex contractu).
" See, e.g., Peele v. Harsell, 258 N.C. 680, 129 S.E.2d 97 (1963) (plaintiff
misconstrued the nature of the cause of action stated; it was tort, not
contract). Much of the law of warranty, which was originally a tort but
came to be considered contractual, is now regarded as tortious. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), ToRTs, § 402A (Tent. Draft 1962).
" See Midgett v. North Carolina State Highway Comm'n, 260 N.C. 241,
132 S.E.2d 599 (1963).
17 See note 10 supra.
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amount, there is no real basis for placing special limits on any cate-
gory of civil suit.
C. Amount in Controversy
Subject to some exceptions, the most common-sense approach
to the jurisdiction of the new district courts would be to limit them
to claims involving a certain dollar amount. However, this, though
easier than a subject-matter limitation, has its own problems. When
the suit is one for damages, the plaintiff's prayer may ask for an
amount far in excess of what he really hopes to get. Obviously, a
preliminary investigation into plaintiff's "real" damages is undesir-
able and wasteful. But the federal rule, on the whole, works quite
well: If the claim is unliquidated, then the plaintiff's prayer will be
the guide, unless it appears to a legal certainty that he could not
recover the amount requested.' Penalties may be imposed if the
plaintiff in fact recovers less than alleged.'" This should be sufficient
to prevent serious abuse. Furthermore, in most s.mall claims ap-
propriate to the district court ihe problem would seldom arise.
Actions on contract, or account stated, or the like almost always
involve a certain amount of money.
Assuming that the district courts will be empowered to give
equity relief or other special relief, as in claim and delivery actions,
there is also a problem of determining the value or amount in con-
troversy in such cases.' ° But again the plaintiff may be required to
allege the value of the specific item sought and his good faith allega-
tion can be made controlling. In all cases plaintiff may be subjected
to a penalty if, at trial, it appears that such allegation was not made
18 E.g., Wade v. Rogala, 270 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1959). On the federal
rule generally, see WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 93 (1963) [hereinafter cited
as WRIGHT]. There are a number of corollary rules. For example, the
failure to state a cause of action is grounds for dismissal on the merits, but
has nothing to do with the amount in controversy. See, e.g., Schunk v.
Moline, Milburn & Stoddart Co., 147 U.S. 500 (1892). Likewise an amount
is "in controversy" if either party stands to lose that amount, even though
the other party is not so deeply involved. See Pennsylvania Ins. Co. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 226 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Va. 1964).
"o See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331(b), -32(b) (1958), which allow the court
to refuse plaintiff costs when he wins, but gets less than the jurisdictional
amount. However, it has been noted that the value of this provision is in
doubt. See WRIGHT 96.
" See Van Norman v. Van Norman, 203 Miss. 310, 34 So.2d 733 (1948)
(value in replevin is market value of items to be replevined). Perhaps some
cases will be so difficult to evaluate in monetary terms that the amount in
controversy standard ought not be used. Receiverships may be examples of
such cases.
1964]
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in good faith, but this would not deprive the court of jurisdiction.
Likewise, provision may be made for transfer to a more appropriate
division whenever it appears that there is a substantial likelihood
that the amount in question is greater or smaller than plaintiff as-
serts. This can be done because the important thing is not the exact
amount involved; it matters not whether plaintiff's claim is 1000
dollars or 1001 dollars. What matters is that relatively small claims
are tried in the district courts and relatively large claims are tried in
the superior court. In case of doubt, transfer to the other division
is appropriate and it makes no difference if it turns out in the end
that transfer was not really necessary. The important thing is
to minimize disputes on such preliminary matters.
Of course, monetary limits on the district court's jurisdiction are
not entirely satisfactory, since some disputes may arise concerning
them. But on the whole they present a simple pattern, and it is
desirable that they be used without additional subject-matter limita-
tions, with exceptions to be noted.
D. Equity Powers
Under the present system inferior courts do not have power to
give affirmative equitable relief,2" though they may hear equitable
defenses.' Equitable remedies, such as the injunction, are power-
ful weapons, and since they are in personam orders in most cases,
they involve the contempt power. This extraordinary power must
be exercised with care and discretion, and it is not surprising that
the power has traditionally been denied to judges of inferior courts.
At the same time, lack of equity powers sometimes means that
an inferior court must operate inefficiently or even unfairly. Per-
haps the most notoriously unfair case is the North Carolina decision
in Mauney v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.23 There the plaintiff was
insured under a health policy and made claims on it against the
insurer in recorder's court. The insurer defended on the ground of
fraud in the procurement of the policy. Since this is an equitable
defense, and not an affirmative equitable claim, the recorder's court
had jurisdiction to sustain the defense and it did so. The insurer,
however, also asked for affirmative equitable relief-cancellation of
the policy for the same fraud-which the recorder's court granted.
" See note 23 infra.
"Armstrong Grocery Co. v. Banks, 185 N.C. 149, 116 S.E. 173 (1923).
209 N.C. 499, 184 S.E. 82 (1936).
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The plaintiff then waited until the policy's incontestable period had
run and brought an action on the policy in superior court. Since the
incontestable period had run, the insurer could not defend on fraud
and was forced to defend on the ground that the policy had been
cancelled. The court held that the cancellation was ineffective,
since the recorder's court had no jurisdiction to give affirmative
equitable relief. The result seems unconscionable because, on a tech-
nicality, it binds the insurer to a policy proved to have been procured
by fraud. Even so, the insurer could have instituted a new suit be-
fore the incontestable period had run in order to seek cancellation
in the superior court, and this would have protected the insurer.
Under the present rule, this is what the insurer must do. If the
insurer does so, that means that there will be two suits where one
would have been entirely sufficient. Thus, the rule which denies
equity powers to inferior courts seems either to promote injustice
or to promote excessive litigation. Neither result is desirable.
In some situations the rule means that for a man with a small
claim, equitable remedies are denied altogether, as where a second
suit is not even possible. For example, this occurred in a recent
Vermont decision.' Plaintiff sued on a contract for sale of furni-
ture. Defendant admitted the contract, but said that all the items
were not delivered as promised since the leaf in a dining table was
missing. The municipal court held for the plaintiff on the contract,
but on condition that it deliver the missing table leaf. The supreme
court reversed saying that this was relief conditioned on specific
performance and that the municipal court, therefore, had no juris-
diction. The case was remanded with instructions that the defendant
pay on the contract after deducting the value of the leaf. It seems
clear that equity was denied on this small claim.
The Courts Commission will have to make a decision whether to
perpetuate the old rule against equitable remedies in inferior courts.
These shining examples of inefficiency and injustice should be fairly
convincing that the old rule is often undesirable. At the same time,
there no doubt remains historical resistence to the use of equity in
inferior courts. A part of the answer may turn on whether a full
jury trial is permitted in the new district courts. Perhaps a better
solution would be compromise, several forms of which are possible:
(1) Furnish equity powers to the inferior courts, but require con-
" Lash Furniture Co. v. Norton, 196 A.2d 506 (Vt. 1963).
1964]
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tempt hearings to be heard in the superior court. (2) Furnish equity
powers to the inferior courts, but permit review in the superior court
on all matters of discretion, substituting the discretion of the superior
court judge for that of the district judge on review. Since most
equitable remedies are discretionary and not of right, this would
provide rather full review in the superior courts but not a new jury
trial. (3) Permit ready appeal of at least mandatory orders, with
appropriate provisions for stay of execution. (4) Permit use of
equity powers in inferior courts, but only incidentally to other claims;
if the case is one in which sole relief sought is equitable, require a
transfer to superior court, subject to the waiveability provisions.
One or more of these procedures should be sufficient protection
against abuse of equity powers; and subject to limitations of this
sort, it would seem that the district courts ought to be vested with
such powers.
E. Probate- and Special Proceedings
In many states there is a separate probate court, often so de-
nominated, 5 but sometimes called surrogate's courts20 or orphan's
courts.2 7 In other states, probate jurisdiction is given to some
existing court.28 North Carolina follows neither of these systems.
Primary jurisdiction in probate matters and in a number of "special
proceedings" is vested in the clerk of the superior court with pro-
visions for transfer to the superior court for the trial of issues of
fact.2 '9 The new constitution does not mention probate courts or
probate jurisdiction. It has been suggested that the constitution
abolishes the clerk's probate jurisdiction, since the constitution is
express in its requirement that there be no other courts (or divisions)
than those named.29a However, the clerk has traditionally been
regarded as "an arm of the superior court"8 and it may be theorized
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-2004 (Supp. 1963).
N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 12.2 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2080.301 (Supp. 1963).2 As under the Arkansas statute, supra note 25, where probate jurisdiction
resides in the equity judge, though it is a court separate from the equity
court, with separate docket and separate clerk.
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-273 (1953).
"a N.C. CONsT. art IV, § 1.
"0 See Hunt v. Sneed, 64 N.C. 180 (1870). N.C. GnN. STAT. § 2-1 (1953),
which under the old constitution allocated jurisdiction to the clerk, lends
credence to this theory. Only a lone statement in Russ v. Woodard, 232
N.C. 36, 41, 59 S.E.2d 351, 355 (1950), that the "clerk of Superior Court is
a court" seems to imply otherwise.
[Vol. 42
COURT REFORM
that since the superior court is not abolished, then neither are its
"arms." This is no more than a reading of the new constitution
in the light of the history and tradition well known to those who
wrote it, and there should be no difficulty in sustaining the clerk's
role under the new system.
It has been suggested above that an amount in controversy
limitation will, for the most part, be more feasible than a subject-mat-
ter limitation on jurisdiction.3 0 a This suggestion does not apply to the
field of probate and special proceedings, however. Out of necessity,
probate matters should be heard in one place, so as to permit appro-
priate record-keeping. Furthermore, there is no good way to evalu-
ate probate matters, so that an amount-in-controversy limitation
would not be easy to apply. Probate matters should, then, be as-
signed to the clerk as in the past, and, as in the past, they should not
be parcelled out according to the amount in controversy.
The same is not necessarily true as to special proceedings, many
of which might well be heard in the district court. Perhaps ulti-
mately it would be desirable to re-work procedure in special pro-
ceedings and to assign at least some of them to the district courts.
But in some cases the procedure and the jurisdiction are inextricably
entangled, and any assignment of such cases to the district courts
would involve re-writing the procedure as well. 1  Such a job is
likely to prove too much for the Courts Commission at present, since
that Commission has a heavy task in dealing with more immediate
and pressing matters. Perhaps, then, for the present, special pro-
ceedings ought to be left to the clerk's jurisdiction. However, a
review of special proceedings with an eye to allocating at least some
of them to the district courts is an item for future attention.
The clerk, in the exercise of probate jurisdiction, has been treated
in some ways as an inferior court. He has been denied the power
to give affirmative equitable relief.32 Perhaps without going as far
in giving equity powers as suggested above, it would be desirable to
invest the clerk with the power to give equitable relief incidentally
to matters properly within his jurisdiction. This would always be
oa See Part I, C, supra.
"Eminent domain or condemnation proceedings under N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 40-11 to -29 (1953), furnish a striking example of a matter often handled
by courts. If the property involved were of small value, a district court
proceeding would be entirely appropriate, either with or without an appraisal
commission.
" See Estate of Smith, 200 N.C. 272, 156 S.E. 494 (1931).
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subject to the present requirement that issues of fact be transferred
to the superior court division.
The theory that the clerk is an arm of the superior court may
give rise to the argument that other special "arms" could be created.
It might be tempting, for example, to create a domestic relations or
juvenile judge-as an "arm" of the superior court. But this would
violate the express command of the constitutional amendment that
forbids creation of any new courts. 3  It is one thing to justify the
clerk's jurisdiction under the new scheme, because of his traditional
role, but quite another to violate the constitution by creating an un-
wieldy complex of new courts. No doubt it is desirable that judges
be permitted to specialize in such matters as juvenile problems, but
however desirable that is, this specialization should not come through
the creation of new courts, or even new "arms" of the superior
court.3 4
F. Matters Not Capable of Monetary Valuation
As indicated above, a it would probably be unwise to limit the
"jurisdiction" of the district and superior courts by giving them
"contract" cases or "tort" cases or "title" cases. But, as in the case
of probate, there are cases in which monetary valuation is too dif-
ficult to justify amount-in-controversy as a basis for "jurisdiction."
Foremost among these, in addition to probate, are divorce cases.
In a suit for specific performance, the ultimate value of the contract
may be alleged, even though monetary relief is not sought ;' but it
seems quite impossible to allege the value of relief from an unhappy
marriage. Furthermore, the reasons for avoiding subject-matter
classifications such as "tort" or "contract" are not present in divorce
cases, because it is normally quite certain that a case is one for
divorce or that it is not.
The rule of convenience in divorce cases, therefore, would be
that all cases in which divorce is prayed are to be assigned to either
the district or superior court, regardless whether monetary relief
is also prayed and regardless whether it is large or small. Two
factors weigh heavily in favor of allocating divorce cases to the
"N.C. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1.
,An alternative may be found where there are several district judges in
a district. One or more might specialize in juvenile matters.
"
4
a See Part I, B, supra.
" Cf. Glenwood Light & Water Co. v. Mutual Light, Heat & Power Co.,
239 U.S. 121 (1915) (injunction).
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district, rather than the superior court division. The first is that
the district courts are designed to relieve the superior courts of
relatively small cases, and divorce actions are usually just that. Al-
though they sometimes involve large sums of money, ordinarily
they do not and on the basis of size, difficulty, and urgency, divorce
actions seem more appropriate to the district than to the superior
court division. There is another possible reason for this allocation
of divorce cases. It is possible that district judges may come to
"specialize" in certain fields such as domestic relations and juvenile
matters. This could be done if districts are of such size that a num-
ber of district judges work in each district. In such a situation, the
chief district judge could normally assign one of these judges to
divorce cases, thus permitting him to acquire special knowledge and
experience in that area. Specialization to this extent could not easily
be accomplished in the case of superior court judges. The district
courts therefore seem the best triers of divorce cases, always as-
suming that a jury trial will be provided in those courts.
It does not follow, of course, that disputes growing out of do-
mestic relations problems must all be allocated to the district court.
A quiet title action involving real property worth 20,000 dollars
should not be allocated to the district court merely because the action
is between former spouses and title is based upon the divorce decree.
Such an action, or an action for arrears in alimony in a substantial
amount, may well be allocated to the superior court division. This
point may suggest the magnitude of the drafting problem that faces
the Courts Commission.
Another kind of case in which an amount-in-controversy test is
impossible to apply is the suit attacking the constitutionality of an
ordinance or statute. If the statute alleged to be unconstitutional
affects personal rights, monetary valuation is an impossibility."'
If it affects property rights, monetary valuation is possible, but it
would be difficult to prove.3 The most convenient rule would seem
to be that such cases may originate in the superior court division,
regardless of the amount in controversy. The superior court division
"' Hence in some such cases, the federal system dispenses with the amount
in controversy limitation altogether, as in 71 Stat. 637 (1957), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1971(d) (1958) (civil rights). The same result is reached judicially.
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
"' See, illustrating difficulties here, McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance
Corp., 298 U.S. 178 (1935); Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263 (1934).
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seems the logical choice because of the importance of constitutional
litigation.
Here again there may be truly great drafting problems if the
Courts Commission attempts to prevent trivial cases from clogging
the superior courts. If, in an automobile accident involving only
several hundred dollars, one party is charged with violation of a
statute, he should not be permitted to try the case in the superior
court division merely because he alleges that the statute is unconstitu-
tional. Here, however, federal analogies are abundant and helpful,
and the rule that only constitutional questions appearing on the face 8
of a well pleaded 9 complaint will be sufficient to invoke the superior
court jurisdiction under this head might suffice. Or the superior
court jurisdiction over constitutional questions might be invoked
only- when plaintiff sues for injunctive or declaratory relief on that
specific ground. In any event some form of rule should be found to
prevent frivolous allegations of unconstitutionality in order to invoke
superior court jurisdiction over cases that are otherwise small.
There are perhaps other actions in which monetary valuation is
so difficult that such cases must be allocated to one division or
another on the basis of subject-matter. Corporate receiverships 40
may be an example, since it would be difficult to determine the value
of the corporation or the total corporate debt, and since the indi-
vidual creditor's claim does not seem to be a good measuring rod
for the importance of such matters. However, it seems desirable
to avoid creating any more of these subject-matter categories than
absolutely necessary, because eventually there will be considerable
overlapping. Even in the categories suggested here-probate, di-
vorce, and constitutional questions-there will arise cases which fall
in both categories, and when this happens, there will likely be con-
fusion about which division of the court is a proper one for hearing.
For example, a constitutional question may arise in a divorce case
or even in a probate matter. If divorce cases are allocated to the
district court division and constitutional cases to the superior court
division, where is a divorce action to be filed if the plaintiff therein
also asserts a constitutional right or seeks to void a statute? When
only these two categories, divorce and constitutional questions, are
involved, a statutory rule can be framed; but if additional subject-
8 See Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
" See Joy v. St. Louis, 201 U.S. 332.(1906).
"
0N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-507.1 to -507-11 (Supp. 1963).
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matter categories are added, statutory provisions would have to be
unduly detailed to avoid the problem. Again, then, it seems wise
to use the amount-in-controversy test whenever possible, subject only
to exception in cases like those described above.
II. WAIVEABILITY OF JURISDICTIONAL LIMITS
Since there is to be but one court, the General Court of Justice,
the only jurisdictional question is whether that court, the General
Court of Justice, has jurisdiction. Although this comment has been
using the term "jurisdiction," it is for convenience only, and is not,
strictly speaking, at all accurate. It may be error to try certain cases
in the district court, but if so, an objection must be made, just .as it
must be made to any other alleged error. In other words, the
ancient rule that one may never waive "jurisdiction"4 has no applica-
tion in the new system, so long as some division of the General Court
of Justice has jurisdiction. This much is the logic of the "unified
court system." However, the constitution goes on to provide that
the implementing legislation "may" provide for waiveability of juris-
dictional defects." The inference is that unless legislation affirma-
tively provides for waiveability, the new system will not be truly
unified, and jurisdictional objections, as before, may be raised at any
time. Perhaps it was wise to leave this rule for legislation, but it is
highly desirable that "waiveability" be provided for. Under the
present rule, a plaintiff may try his case in an inferior court, .and if
he loses, then object to the jurisdiction for the first time, on appeal,
or even in another suit4 3 The defendant, of course, may do the
same. There is no logical reason for this rule, but it is quite well
settled. It is also quite clearly undesirable in the vast majority of
cases. Therefore, it is hoped that the legislature will make explicit
what is already implicit in a unified court system-namely, that
any objection to the "jurisdiction" of a divisional court must be
timely made, or is waived.
However, all this does not mean that the trial judge must await
an objection before taking action. If it appears to him that there is
a jurisdictional question he should raise it himself and furnish ap-
propriate opportunity for the parties to argue the point if necessary,
"' See Dobbs, Decline of Jurisdiction by Consent, 40 N.C.L. REv. 49
(1961).
"N.C. CoNST. art. IV, § 10(4).
'8 See Dobbs, supra note 41.
"See WRIGHT § 7.
1964l
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
If there is no "jurisdiction" the judge should transfer the case to a
more appropriate division. Most judges would probably prefer to
eliminate a case from the docket, so that there is no need to fear that
these judges would fail to transfer a case that is clearly appropriate
to some other division.
A. Nonwaiveable Matters
1. Generally-Although most objections to "jurisdiction" will
be waiveable under a unified court system, perhaps a few will not
be, and a party may be permitted to raise some jurisdictional ques-
tions at any time. For example, if a workmen's compensation claim
were tried in the district court rather than before the Industrial
Commission, the judgment rendered would not be valid, even though
no objection had been made to the jurisdiction. This is true because
no division of the General Court of Justice has original jurisdiction
of compensation claims, and there is truly a defect in jurisdiction.
The same would be true where jurisdiction is vested exclusively in
the federal courts.4 5 This is quite unlike the situation in which the
superior court division should have heard a certain case which has
been tried-erroneously--by the district court division. In that
situation the defect can be waived, for it is not truly a jurisdictional
defect at all, but merely a question of which division should try the
case. Unless the legislature provides otherwise, therefore, a juris-
dictional objection is not waiveable if no division of the General
Court has jurisdiction. There are some especially good reasons why
this should be so, at least in the case of workmen's compensation
claims. One is that the Industrial Commission, more familiar with
these claims, can handle them more expeditiously, and probably on
the whole more expertly, than courts. The Commission's power to
handle such claims should not be undermined by permitting parties,
even accidentally, to waive jurisdictional objections. 46
2. Probate-If the legislature accepts the principal of waiveability
"' See, e.g., Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940). A common case is the
one in which exclusive jurisdiction is in the National Labor Relations Board.
See Er parte George, 371 U.S. 72 (1962), and In re Green, 369 U.S. 689(1962), where it was held that the state courts are without jurisdiction to
enjoin picketing or strikes.
"'A different approach, however, would be justified if a claimant makes
a compensation claim before the Commission and is given an award. If it
later appears that he was not an employee but an independent contractor,
perhaps the award should nevertheless stand. The present rule in North
Carolina is otherwise. Hart v. Thomasville Motors, Inc., 244 N.C. 84, 92
S.E.2d 673 (1956).
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of jurisdictional objections, one exception to waiveability ought to
be provided for. Probate matters should be heard only in the su-
perior court division, by the clerk in the first instance. The parties
should not be permitted to waive this requirement and try a probate
matter in the district court. The reason for this is that appropriate
records ought to be kept of probate proceedings and they ought to be
kept where they can be found-in the clerk's probate records. They
ought not to bind others until they are so located. Therefore, no
district court should try a probate matter directly related to the need
for complete records, and if such a matter goes to judgment in the
district court, the judgment should not be binding, except, perhaps,
on the parties actually participating. However, this does not mean
that every dispute concerning an estate must be tried in the superior
court division. Small disputes related to a decedent's estate, might
well be tried in district courts provided the judgment records in such
cases are not necessary to complete probate records. Likewise, there
is no reason why the clerk, when confronted with an issue of fact to
be tried by a jury, could not transfer a small matter to the district
rather than to the superior court division.47 All this should be
provided for by the implementing legislation.
B. Judicial Limitations on Jurisdiction
Statutes usually limit the jurisdiction of courts by specifying
their powers over certain subject matters and certain amounts in
controversy.4" The usual rule is that if there is service of process
and the court in question has jurisdiction of the subject matter and
the amount in controversy, its judgment will be valid unless appealed
or vacated in a direct attack.49 The fact that its judgment was
erroneous does not affect the validity of the judgment, except on
appeal or motion to vacate."0 If the judgment is pleaded years later
as res judicata in another suit, it will be binding on the parties even
,' Under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-273 (1953), the clerk now transfers matters
to the superior court docket whenever fact issues are presented. If the
matter pending involves a small amount, the clerk could appropriately transfer
to the district court.
48 See notes 7-8 supra.
See 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 354 (5th ed. 1925).
80An interesting example is Howard v. Boyce, 254 N.C. 255, 118 S.E.2d
897 (1961), subsequent appeal, 255 N.C. 712, 122 S.E.2d 601 '(1961). There
was a judgment; thereafter it was attacked collaterally in another action, in
which the court refused to permit such an attack; thereafter it was attacked
directly by motion in the cause, and this direct attack was permitted under
the circumstances presented there.
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though wrong.5" This is a sound rule, since the parties had a fair
opportunity to attack any error by appeal, and no judgment would
ever be reliable if it could be attacked at any time. On the other
hand, if the rendering court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter,
the judgment is void and does not bind the parties, since under the
existing law failure to object to jurisdiction does not waive the
jurisdictional defect.52
In spite of the general rule, that error of law or procedure does
not affect jurisdiction, there are cases in which ordinary error has
been said to be "jurisdictional.153  In such cases courts have in
effect held an erroneous judgment void and refused to give it res
judicata effect. For example, a court in a divorce case gave a wife
more than her share of the property. Later the husband sought to
quiet title and the wife defended by producing the judgment award-
ing title to her. In such a case the erroneous decision which gave
the wife more than her proper share was said to be in excess of the
court's jurisdiction." Hence the judgment was void and the hus-
band won the quiet title suit. There are numerous examples.5 In
such cases the courts talk about lack of "jurisdiction" but it is quite
apparent that the court rendering the judgment did have jurisdic-
tion; it only made an error, and no one appealed. On ordinary
principles5" such a judgment ought to be valid; it ought not be sub-
ject to collateral attack, because the court clearly had jurisdiction
even if it committed error in applying the law. Since the court
clearly had jurisdiction, decisions of this sort are really saying that
some judgments will not be given res judicata effect, even though
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. In other words,
decisions like that in the example are not decisions about jurisdiction
at all, but are decisions that, for policy reasons, some judgments
should not be given effect. Sometimes public interest demands this
result even though it makes judgments less reliable. A clear example
5 See note 50 supra.
52 See Dobbs, supra note 41.
"E.g., Whitten v. Coit, 385 P.2d 131 (Colo. 1963); Callaway v. Harris,
229 N.C. 117, 47 S.E.2d 796 (1948); Ange v. Owens, 224 N.C. 514, 31
S.E.2d 521 (1944); Holloman v. Holloman, 127 N.C. 15, 37 S.E. 68 (1900).
See generally, 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 354 (5th ed. 1925).
" Vasquez v. Vasquez, 109 Cal. App. 2d 280, 240 P.2d 310 (1952).
" See cases cited note 53 supra.
"' Even on direct attack by action in equity, mere error is not normally
sufficient to justify vacation of the judgment. See RESTATEMENT, JUnG-
MENTS § 126 (1942).
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of such public interest occurs where it is held that X must pay certain
customs duties. A later decision shows that such a judgment is
erroneous. If X is bound by the tariff, he must pay more than his
competitors, and he is put in a disadvantageous competitive situation.
This is not only inequitable, but does not serve society's policy of
free and full competition. Therefore, it is appropriate to relieve X
of the tariff burden, even though a court of competent jurisdiction
has said he must pay it. In other words, the judgment against X
will not be given res judicata effect.S
Since the decision in cases like those mentioned has nothing to
do with "jurisdiction," but is only a decision on policy grounds to
limit the res judicata effect normally given judgments, the unified
court system probably will not affect such cases at all. Even though
jurisdictional defects may be waiveable under the new system, there
will still be cases in which a former judgment is not given effect.
This will not be for lack of jurisdiction, but because policy so dictates
in rare cases. It is to be hoped that the court will take the oppror-
tunity to treat such cases as rare exceptions having nothing to do
with jurisdiction.
The problem of waiveability of jurisdictional objections comes to
this in summary: (1) The ordinary rule should be that jurisdictional
defects are waiveable if some division of the General Court of Justice
has jurisdiction. (2) If no division of the General Court has juris-
diction, as where it is vested in the Industrial Commission, then the
defect of jurisdiction may not be waived. (3) In probate cases,
jurisdiction ought to be exclusively in the superior court division,
through its clerk as in the past, and this ought not to be waiveable.
(4) In certain cases, judgments may not be given effect even though
the court rendering the judgment had jurisdiction or jurisdictional
objections were waived; this should be rare and applied only in the
public interest. It has nothing to do with jurisdiction.
III. OPERATION OF DISTRICT COURTS
A. Generally
The details of district court operation are not provided for in the
constitution but are left for legislation. However, district courts
" United States v. Stone & Downer Co., 274 U.S. 225 (1927). The
principle is applied in a variety of cases. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S.
591 (1948) (taxes); Christian v. Jemison, 303 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1962)
(constitutional rights). Cf. Monon R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen,
215 F. Supp. 430 (D.C. Ill. 1963) (public interest).
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will be different from previous courts in at least one respect-there
may be more than one judge. At a minimum there will be the district
judge himself, one in each county, and the magistrates serving under
him."' In larger counties, there may be several district judges as
well as magistrates, and if so, one will be designated as chief district
judge for the county."' He will act as an administrative as well as
a judicial officer, for example, by assigning cases to other district
judges and to magistrates. Although there must be a district court
for each county, nothing prohibits the creation of a district court to
serve several smaller counties.
Legislation implementing the constitution seemingly should keep
three distinct purposes of the district court in view. One important
purpose of the district court is to handle the trial of all but the most
important cases, so as to permit the superior court division to keep
up with more important trials, and the "jurisdictional" amount must
be set accordingly. A second function of the district courts will be
to permit some specialization of judges, for example, in juvenile
court matters, since there can no longer be a separate court for
this purpose. The third distinct purpose of the district courts
is to permit the inexpensive and expeditious trial of really small
claims-claims so small that large investments of time and money
are not justified and claims that can be disposed of with a minimum
of formality. Each of these purposes calls for special provision.
B. District Court Trials
Since the district court should serve to protect the superior court
from relatively unimportant cases, it seems desirable that there be a
full jury trial in the district court, with appeal only on issues of law.
The de novo appeal with a jury trial on smaller matters should be
abolished. Where equitable relief is granted in the district court,
the superior court division should also review the discretion of the
district judge. 0 Otherwise, in cases tried in the district court
division, the superior court should sit solely as an appellate court.
If jury is waived in the district court, there should be no further
opportunity for a jury trial. Such a system would eliminate the
use of superior court juries in small cases and require that the
merits be tried in the district court. This would reserve the superior
N.C. CoNsr. art. IV, § 8.
"Ibid.
"See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
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courts for more important cases, which could then be tried more
expeditiously, and for appellate work.
It seems desirable to carry out this purpose that the district courts
be given all cases involving less than a stated amount in controversy
and that the amount be set fairly high. Some of the county courts
now authorized have jurisdiction up to 5000 dollars and jury trial
with a full twelve-man jury.' It would be desirable to provide such
limits for the new district courts.
All of this would mean that the district court division is a court
of rather more importance than some of the present inferior courts,
and it is desirable that the district judge, be paid accordingly. In
other words, a low salary scale for these new judges would inevitably
undermine the new system; it would either force the legislature to
limit the district court's jurisdiction and thus crowd superior court
dockets, or it would mean that less able judges would be deciding
these substantial cases. Either result would be disastrous for the
success of the new system.
C. Specialization and Expertise
The present system of courts includes a rather half-hearted at-
tempt to permit specialization of some judges in juvenile and do-
mestic matters. Separate juvenile courts are authorized to hear
juvenile and domestic matters,' and where they are not created, the
clerk of the superior court has some jurisdiction, as.a department of
the superior court.3 There is perhaps no great need for specializa-
tion in the area of divorce and alimony, but it is widely thought"
that juvenile matters ought to be committed to a judge who can gain
" Civil county courts under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7-332 (1953). The civil
county courts under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7-308 (1953) cover up to $3,000. The
general county court under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7-265 (1953), has jurisdiction
"concurrent with the superior court" in "all actions found on contract" and
also "in all actions not founded on contract." It may try title, grant restrain-
ing orders and injunctions and hear divorce and alimony cases. District
county courts under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7-297 (1953), are the same except
that they include more than one county. Civil county courts under N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7-383.1 (1953), have jurisdiction up to $3,000. Civil county
courts under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7-351 (1953), and special county courts under
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7-405 (1953), have jurisdiction up to $1,500 in some
matters, less in others.
' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7-101 (Supp. 1963).
:'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-22 (Supp. 1963).
' See Statement and Recommendations to the North Carolina Courts
Commission by the North Carolina Domestic Relations and Juvenile Court
Judges Association, Public Hearings of the Courts Commission, March 13,
1964 (on file in Institute of Government Library).
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experience in such special cases. Under the new constitutional sys-
tem no separate juvenile court may be created, since the constitution
expressly provides that no courts other than those named may be
created. 5 However, in at least some counties, the district court may
be staffed with several district judges. Where that is so, the chief
district judge may, as a matter of practice, assign juvenile cases
routinely to a given district judge. This would permit that judge to
specialize and become somewhat expert in that class of cases. The
same can be done with any other class of cases if it is thought de-
sirable.
In some smaller counties there is probably no justification even
for a full-time district judge, much less for a staff of several district
judges. In such situations one solution would be to permit the
district judges to "ride circuit" in a limited area. For example,
three judges might work together as the district judges of four or
five counties. Each county would have its separate district court, but
the same judge that served such a county might also serve several
other counties. On the whole, however, it seems desirable to pro-
vide at least one district judge for each county wherever judicial
business justifies it, so as to keep the district court open for trial
most of the time and to enable the district judge to superintend the
magistrates properly.
D. Small Claims and the Magistrates
The third function of the district court is to handle the truly
small claims quickly and cheaply. The really small claim, one in-
volving less than a few hundred dollars, can be justly disposed of
only if a final judgment costs the parties very little and only then if
settlement is quick. In recognition of this principle, some Pennsyl-
vania small claims courts are really arbitration tribunals.60 Perhaps
we need not yet go so far as to provide compulsory arbitration, but
the growing use of arbitration by constant litigants such as insurers,
is good testimony that we need more efficient court procedures. The
small claim is an excellent place to provide quick adjudication and
inexpensive, informal procedures.
Under systems prevalent in many states small claims are often
heard before local justices or other inferior judges, and it is not
"N.C. CONsT. art. IV, § 1.
60 PA. STAT. Ar. tit. 5, § 30 (1958). Their operation in Philadelphia is
discussed in Zal, Philadelphia's Municipal Court Eliminates Backlog, 47
A.B.A.J. 1101 (1961).
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necessary for litigants to travel to the county seat to settle debt
claims or property damage claims. This aspect of the justice court
system is desirable and ought to be preserved if possible. But the
new constitution makes the magistrate a minor judicial officer of
the district court;, 7 he does not run his own court nor keep his own
docket. He operates under the district judges and on their assign-
ment. Thus, it is not consistent with the unified court system to
permit a man to file a claim with a nearby magistrate; he must file
it with the district court.
Nevertheless, procedure on small claims need not be formal. Nor
need the hearing be held at the county seat if that is inconvenient.
Perhaps the easiest way of indicating the possible convenient pro-
cedure for small claims is to illustrate with hypothetical cases:
1. Case 1-P, a retailer in a small town, has a debt claim against,
D who lives on a farm nearby. The claim is for twenty-five dollars.
The county seat and the district court are on the far side of the
county twenty-five miles away. M is a' magistrate on the district
court and lives nearby. P asks M about the claim. M gives P a
short form to fill out and mail to the district court. P mails in the
form with a small cost deposit or fee. The district clerk then sends
a summons to D, notifying him of the claim; M is notified of the
assignment to him after the district judge inspects the answer and
concludes that the case is a proper one for a magistrate. M holds
an informal hearing in a local court provided for the purpose. He
acts, when possible, as a conciliator, but if necessary he renders a
final, short-form judgment. This he mails to the district court.
The parties are notified that they must appeal within so many days
or obey the judgment. If they do not appeal, the judgment should
become a final judgment of the district court.
All this can normally be done in no more than a week or ten days.
There are appropriate records kept in the court, but at the same time
procedure is informal and inexpensive. Since the magistrate acts
when possible for conciliation, his efforts, if successful, discourage
unnecessary and expensive appeals. Judicial time has been used
efficiently. This, of course, may not be the solution accepted; but it
is one solution that could work.
It is quite obvious that a magistrate operating in the way sug-
gested, operates more like an arbitrator or a mediator than like a
"' N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 8.
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judge. Clearly he is not apt to be the master of the details of proxi-
mate cause-if, indeed, anyone is-nor the finer points of the doc-
trine of worthier title. Should we not, then, limit his "jurisdiction"
to very simple cases? The answer seems to be that the only way we
can limit his "jurisdiction" is to limit that of the district court, for
the magistrate is not operating his own court, as a justice was; he
is acting as an officer of the district court division. What must be
done to limit the magistrate is to provide that only certain kinds of
cases are to be assigned to him by the district judge or the district
clerk. A double check may be provided by requiring the district
judge to approve all magistrate judgments before their final entry.
Again an illustration may be easier:
2. Case 2-P claims title to Blackacre, a small parcel of land
worth only about one hundred dollars. He proceeds as outlined in
Case 1. When the informal complaint reaches the district court, the
district judge observes that title to land is involved. He concludes
that decision is inappropriate for a magistrate since fairly complex
legal issues may be involved; therefore, he does not assign the case
to the magistrate, but puts it on his own docket and notifies the
parties by mail as before. This notice contains notice of opportunity
to demand a jury trial. The case is then tried by the district judge
and not by the magistrate and proceeds as any other case in the
district court.
Of course, the district judge may not pay sufficient attention to
the claim and may routinely assign it to a magistrate. This may be
a mistake, but after the magistrate holds a hearing and renders a
judgment, the district judge must approve it before it becomes final.
At this point he may realize that he should have tried the case him-
self. He should be permitted, if he deems it wise, to order review
by himself, in view of the importance of the subject matter. On the
other hand, this should not be necessary to the validity of the judg-
ment, for the parties, if dissatisfied, may appeal and obtain a jury
trial in the district court. If they do not appeal, there seems no
reason why the judgment should not be held valid.
In short the magistrate is an officer of the district court and
should be treated as one."" He is a minor officer, though, and subject
to review by the district judge himself. The district judge should
be permitted considerable latitude in assignment of cases, and legisla-
as Ibid.
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tion might do well to give him only some general guidelines. It
might well provide that the district judge should normally assign
cases to convenient magistrates as in Case 1 above, when the claim
appears to involve a stated small amount. It might further provide
that the district judge should have authority to docket the case for
trial by himself or another district judge when it appears that im-
portant legal issues are involved, as with land title cases. But since
there is appeal and jury trial in the district court, none of this should
be mandatory, nor should it affect the validity of the magistrate's
unappealed judgment.
The controlling consideration in all cases is administrative ease.
If the legislature provides for assignment of cases to magistrates
involving less than 300 dollars, then the district judge should judge
as best he can from the informal complaint what amount is involved
and assign the case to his own or to the magistrate's docket-ac-
cordingly. If he makes an error and it turns out that the case in
fact involves 350 dollars, the assignment to the magistrate and the
magistrate's judgment should still be valid unless and until appealed.
Appeals from the magistrate must be heard by a jury de novo
unless jury trial is waived. The constitution is explicit on both
points. If the magistrate system is successful, there should be very
few appeals, since an appeal will defeat the purpose of the magistrate
-to administer justice quickly and cheaply. In some small claims
cases one party often can afford delay better than the other, so that
threat of appeal, with its attendant expense and delay, is a form of
legal duress. To minimize this and to help make the magistrate
effective, appeals should be discouraged in small claims cases.
Several devices are available for this purpose: (1) Jury trial may
be granted on demand only, as in the federal system.6" (2) Court
costs may appropriately be taxed more heavily against the losing
party on appeal from the magistrate if he demands a jury trial. (3)
The magistrate's decision may be used as evidence; or (4) the magis-
trate's decision may be presumed correct, thus placing the burden
on the appealing party, if a jury is demanded, but otherwise not.
These devices do not seem too radical for the truly small claim.
Surely the state ought not to be put to the expense of a jury trial on
a fifty dollar debt claim; surely the district judge can decide the facts
fairly; and surely a demand for jury trial ought not be permitted
"' FED. R. Civ. P. 38(b) (d).
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to force the poor man into a settlement because he cannot afford the
costs or the delay of a jury trial.
IV. TRANSFERABILITY
A. Transferability and Derivative Jurisdiction
It is apparent from what has been said that the Courts Commis-
sion has before it a trying task in formulating legislation. Though
the Commission will doubtless provide for mechanics different in
some ways from those that have been broadly outlined, whatever
specific legislation is recommended, all of the considerations men-
tioned will have to beprovided for in some manner. One mechanical
detail that may outweigh many others in importance is the provision
for transfer of cases among divisions of the General Court of Justice.
The constitution provides that the General Court is the one court,
not only for purposes of jurisdiction, but also for purposes of opera-
tion and administration. Free transfer from one division of the
Court to another, and from county to county is essential to the
operation ,of the unified court system. If a case is brought in the
wrong division, the remedy is a motion to transfer to the right one,
not a dismissal. Since the constitution" gives some powers in the
area of administrative agencies so that they may be adjusted har-
moniously with the courts, a similar provision might be made to
permit transfer to appropriate administrative tribunals in some
instances. This would prevent dismissal and consequent problems
when the statute of limitations has run.
There has been considerable tendency in North Carolina to permit
interlocutory appeals or to permit the use of certiorari as a substitute
therefor. The question then arises whether action on a motion to
transfer is appealable. For example, suppose a case brought in the
district court. Defendant moves to transfer to the superior court.
First, where is the motion to be made, in the district court or in the
superior court? Second, if the motion is made in the district court,
is denial thereof appealable to the superior court?71 The answers
"0 N.C. CoNsT. art. IV, § 3 provides that the General Assembly may vest
judicial powers in administrative agencies. Arguably, this is not sufficient
to permit waiver of jurisdictional objections. The provision authorizing
waiver, art. IV, § 10(4), speaks of waiver only in "civil cases." Thus, a
constitutional question might be raised by any legislation in this direction.
See also note 46 supra.
"'An alternative to this motion procedure to transfer is a removal pro-
cedure, analogous to removal from state to federal court. In this system,
the case is removed without any prior permission or motion and it is re-
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must be carefully drawn, or the system will bog down in decisions
on motions to transfer.
If a full jury trial is permitted in the district court, as has been
suggested, then trial in the district court is-not apt to be prejudicial,
even if, with hindsight, it is clear that the case would have been ap-
propriate to the superior court.' Since district courts in most coun-
ties are apt to be in residence on a. full time basis, the easiest pro-
cedure is probably a motion to transfer in the district court where
the case is pending. If the district court refuses the motion, inter-
locutory appeal is inappropriate. In the first place, since jury trial
will be provided (by hypothesis) no one is likely to be prejudiced-by
having that jury trial in the district court; appeal' to the superior
court after full trial will be sufficient to correct errors of law and if
necessary a' new trial may be provided. In the second place,' the
party moving for transfer may win in the district court, in which
case his motion to transfer is no longer important.
If there is a motion to transfer in the district 'court, which is
denied, aad- the moving party loses the trial on the merits, he will
probably appeal to the superior court. On appeal the superior court,
may either (1) decide the transfer was properly denied, and simply
examine the -appeal on issues of law, in which case .there is no prob-:
lem; or (2) decide that the transfer motion'should have been granted,
that is, that the trial should have been held originally in the superior
court. If this is the decision, a further problem arises. Should the
superior court ( 1) dismiss, (2) proceed to trial of the case de novo,
since it should have been brought in 'the superior court, or (3)
affirm the district court judgment if it is free of error?
Under present doctrines the answer is quite clear. The superior
court in the traditional system has no jurisdiction on the appeal,
because its appellate jurisdiction depends on the original jurisdiction
of the inferior court. The superior court, in the present system,
must dismiss such a case and require that the plaintiff start anew in
the superior court-the same court that has just dismissed.7  This
is the derivative jurisdiction doctrine, a triumph of logic over com-
mon sense, and a waste of judicial time. The implication of the
unified court system is otherwise, however. True the case (by
hypothesis) should have been brought originally in the superior court
manded if the federal court decides it is without jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.
§§1441, 1446 (1958).
" See, e.g., Hargrove v. Cox, 180 N.C. 360, 104 S.E. 757 (1920).
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division; but the district court which tried the case by a jury merely
committed error; it did not exceed its jurisdiction. Hence, dis-
missal is clearly inappropriate under the new unified system.
Two alternatives remain. The superior court could take the
position that, though there was an error-free trial below, the trial
was still in an improper division, and a de novo jury trial should be
had in the superior court. But unless the party moving for transfer
is prejudiced, it is difficult to see why two jury trials should be re-
quired at the expense of the taxpayer and at the additional cost of
delaying the trial of some other case. The better solution for such
a situation would seem to be this: If the trial below was error free,
the judgment of the district court should be affirmed unless (1)
there is a showing that the defendant was prejudiced by failure to
have trial in the appropriate division; or (2) the superior court judge
believes, from all the information known to him, that a new trial
in the superior court should be had in the interests of justice or for
convenience of the court and parties. This latter qualification is
suggested because there may be circumstances when it would take the
superior court judge longer to review issues of law in a written
record than it would to re-try the case. In such a situation the
superior court judge should be permitted to require a new trial in the
superior court-but only in the situation under discussion, that is,
where the case should have been brought in the superior court in
the first place.
A number of details must be provided for concerning transfer-
for example, similar provisions must be made for transfer from
superior court division to the district court division, from the clerk
to the district court, and so on-but the foregoing discussion should
indicate some of the main problems to be considered in any legisla-
tion.
B. Transfer Among Counties and Territorial Jurisdiction
Problems sometime arise in inferior courts as to whether (1)
they have jurisdiction of claims arising outside the county and (2)
whether they may serve process outside the county. The answer in
North Carolina depends in part on which of the present inferior
courts is involved. 8 It seems clear, however, that the new district
" In justice courts, no summons may be served outside the county be-
cause, under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-93 (1953), more than justice-court amounts
must be involved before extra-county service is permitted. In county courts,
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courts can be effective only if they may hear all claims within the
sphere allocated to them, regardless of whether the claim arises with-
in the county or not. Likewise, service of process must extend
throughout the state. All this should be subject to the same venue
requirements as superior court claims, but not otherwise limited.
Similarly, district courts should be permitted to transfer cases
to a more convenient district court, 4 or, where otherwise proper,
to a more convenient superior court outside the county. Again,
fairly detailed provision must be made in the legislation.
V. THE SUPREME COURT
A. Appellate Review
The supreme court, which under the unified system constitutes
the appellate division of the General Court of Justice, will presum-
ably be little changed, if it is changed at all. There may be some
temptation to experiment with a scheme of limited appeals but it
would seem that the basic planning for the new system ought to
come first. If the district courts are given the importance in the
new system suggested in this comment, the superior courts will
probably have more appellate work than they have had in the past.
At least their appellate work will have more appellate character, since,
if jury trials are provided in the district courts, the superior court
division presumably will review only questions of law, and will not
furnish de novo trials. This alone may have the effect of giving
some relief to North Carolina's heavily burdened supreme court.
Indeed the whole system, as envisioned in this comment at least, is
designed to "wash out" more cases at lower levels, and the supreme
court's workload should be reduced considerably if the system is
successful.
Nevertheless, for the present, if there is any temptation to convert
the superior court into an intermediate appellate court, it ought to be
resisted. For example, it would be possible to limit the appeal rights
to the supreme court to cases involving large amounts. The new
several decisions have permitted service outside the county. E.g., Farmers
Cotton Oil Co. v. Blue Ridge Grocery Co., 169 N.C. 521, 86 S.E. 338 (1915).
In Waters v. McBee, 244 N.C. 540, 94 SE.2d 640 (1956), the county court
was held to have jurisdiction (a) on process served outside the county, and
(b) over a cause of action that arose outside the county. In the case of
municipal courts, governing charters may limit territorial jurisdiction. See
State v. Owen, 242 N.C. 525, 88 S.E.2d 832 (1955).
", As is now permitted in the case of superior courts under N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-83 (1953).
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constitution probably permits such a scheme, but limits on appellate
jurisdiction have proved troublesome in most jurisdictions73 and
should be accepted only after careful study. Especially is this so
when review by "remedial writs" provided for in the constitution
remains possible.
B. Remedial or Prerogative Writs
The common law knew a good number of "prerogative writs"
issued by the King's Bench to control lower courts, administrative
agencies, and officers." Familiar among these are the writs of
prohibition, mandamus, habeas corpus, quo warranto, certiorari and
related writs. The new constitution provides that the supreme court
has power to issue any remedial writs necessary to give it a general
supervision and control over the proceedings of the other courts.
The provision seems inadequately adapted to statutory regulation of
some of these writs, and may qualify a number of statutes. 77 The
question may also be raised whether the same writs may issue to
control administrative agencies or officials, as a matter of the supreme
court's original jurisdiction. This has been a troublesome point in
various jurisdictions,"3 and it would have been happy if the consti-
tution had been more to the point. Clarifying legislation may be
possible, though it is clearly of low priority.
C. Rule Making
The constitution was also niggardly in giving the supreme court
rule-making power. The court is unhampered in making its own
rules, but to make rules of practice for the district or superior courts,
(1) the General Assembly must first authorize such rules and (2)
then approve the rules so made.79 A few years ago a great many
people would have argued that this provision was too narrow and
that the supreme court ought to be permitted more rule-making
' See, e.g., Kimbrough v. Parker, 407 Ill. 274, 95 N.E.2d 473 (1950)(difficulty in determining whether appeal concerned a "freehold," appellate
court being limited to questions on "freehold"); Pittsburg Bridge Co. v. St.
Louis Transit Co. 205 Mo. 176, 103 S.W. 546 (1907) (difficulty in determin-
ing jurisdictional amount on appeal).
'See 1 HoLDswoRTu, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 226-31 (7th ed. 1956).
" It has been said in broad dictum that under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-511(1953) only the superior court can issue mandamus. Tate v. Commissioners
of Haywood County, 122 N.C. 661, 29 S.E. 60 (1898). A similar statute
applies to quo warranto actions. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-514 (1953).
"Attorney General v. Blossom, 1 Wis. 277 (1853).
"'N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 11.
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powers. Perhaps it should, but rule-making, while often an effective
tool of good judicial administration has proved not to be a panacea.
In any event, the United States Supreme Court is similarly limited °
and has, on the whole, produced some remarkably good rules with
the aid of advisors.81
VI. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE AND THE COURTS COMMISSSION
The new constitution is specific in requiring an administrative
office of the courts to "enforce" the unified court system and the
requirement of uniform administration.82 Beyond that the consti-
tution does not specify the functions of the administrative office, but
there is legislation elsewhere, notably in the federal system,83 that
can be used as a guide. The administrative office of the United
States Courts is probably now well-nigh indispensable, and its services
have been generally impressive. The federal administrative office
is charged with the duty of keeping information on the state of the
dockets so as to permit appropriate action in courts that are over-
crowded.8" It is to prescribe certain administrative forms for clerks
and other administrative personnel, 5 and in North Carolina this
function would be important in making forms and charges uniform.
The administrative officer is also the disbursing officer in the federal
system, paying out monies appropriated for maintenance of the
courts, and he is purchasing officer, arranging for purchase, ex-
change, or distribution of law books, equipment and supplies.8
Perhaps the administrative officer can be summed up as an ex-
ecutive secretary of the courts. His full time job, unlike the job of
any other officer in the court system, is to make the system, as a
whole, run smoothly. He is not, of course, the "boss" of the system;
he is its servant. But as its servant, he proposes plans for the co-
ordination of the system. If the Courts Commission continues to
function after the initial legislation is passed, the administrative
office can well work with the Commission on continuing problems of
8028 U.S.C. § 2072 (1958).
A reading of the advisory committee's notes to the last amendments
may serve to indicate the painstaking effort that is made. These notes are
included in the 1963 pocket supplement to Title 28, United States Code
Annotated.
8, N.C. CoNsr. art. IV, § 13.
U.S.C. §§ 601-10 (1958).
8428 U.S.C. § 604(a) (2) (1958). Assignment of judges is made under
28 U.S.C. §§ 291-96 (1958).See 28 U.S.C. § 604 (a) (1) (1958).
8828 U.S.C. § 604(a) (9) (1958).
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judicial administration and procedure. These agencies would be
somewhat analogous to the administrative office of the United States
Courts and the Advisors on federal rules. Both would work with
the judiciary, through the judicial conference, as in the federal sys-
tem, or some other appropriate judicial body. The prospect of ulti-
mate success of the new system hinges in large part on the successful
use of the administrative office, and its acceptance as a useful servant
by the judiciary and the clerks. In public hearings, the clerks have
already expressed a hopeful attitude toward the administrative
office. 7 If the administrative office is to be successful, it must
attract as director a highly competent lawyer and administrator; to
that end, it is desirable that a quite good salary be provided.
VII. CONCLUSION
There is almost no end to problems that face the Courts Com-
mission in planning legislation to implement the new constitution,
and they cannot all be explored here. This comment has tried to
indicate a few of the important problems in civil jurisdiction and
procedure and some of the possible answers. The Commission's
answers to these problems, of course, may be different. Its task is
difficult and not everyone will agree on specific proposals. The new
constitution has been described as among the greatest judicial re-
forms yet to be enacted for state courts."8 Whatever the answers
furnished by the Courts Commission and later the legislature, those
bodies must at least tackle the problems suggested here and provide
some answers not based on the old system, if the reform is to become
a reality. If reform is successful, the complex problems described
here will be solved and the job of lawyer and judge will be simplified.
DAN B. DOBBS*
8Presentation of North Carolina Association of Clerks of Superior Court
of North Carolina before Courts Commission, March 13, 1964, at 2 (on file
in Institute of Government Library). In this useful testimony the Clerk's
Association commented on the need for uniformity in formal matters, record-
keeping and the like, and suggested the need for a well qualified administrator.
88 Editorial, 46 Am. JuD. Soc. J. 117 (1963) (discussing court reform in
North Carolina and several other states).
* Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
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